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THE CLASS ACTION STRUGGLE: SHOULD BRISTOLMYERS’S LIMIT ON PERSONAL JURISDICTION APPLY TO
CLASS ACTIONS?
ABSTRACT
In Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, the Supreme
Court held that, in a coordinated mass action, a court may not exercise specific
personal jurisdiction over claims from non-resident plaintiffs who did not suffer
their injuries in the forum state. The Court, however, did not explicitly state
whether and how its holding would apply to class actions. In March 2020,
federal appellate courts began to be confronted with the issue. While the D.C.
Circuit in Molock v. Whole Foods Group, Inc. side-stepped the personal
jurisdiction question, Judge Silberman’s dissenting opinion argued that the
logic of Bristol-Myers should apply to class actions as it does to mass actions.
In Mussat v. IQVIA, the Seventh Circuit disagreed, concluding that the
differences between class actions and mass actions are sufficient to distinguish
the holding of Bristol-Myers as applied to the class action context.
This Comment will argue that Bristol-Myers should not be extended to class
actions. Doing so would cause a momentous shift in class action law that is not
supported by the Bristol-Myers opinion. In addition, as Mussat recognizes, mass
actions are significantly different from class actions, as class action members
are not true parties to a class action as mass action plaintiffs are to a mass
action. Moreover, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which sets forth
standards for appropriate certification of class actions, provides a sufficient
procedural basis for protecting defendants’ due process rights. Finally,
applying Bristol-Myers to class actions would defeat the policy purposes of the
class action device and harm the overall efficiency of the litigation system.
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INTRODUCTION
Class action lawsuits occupy a distinctive and important sphere in the
American litigation landscape. An exception to the original concept of litigation
as “strictly a two-party affair—one plaintiff against one defendant”—class
actions allow groups of similarly situated plaintiffs to bring common claims
through named representatives.1 Some of the most famous cases in U.S. history,
including Brown v. Board of Education2 and Roe v. Wade,3 have been class
actions. In addition, class actions have accounted for some of the largest
settlements ever recorded, often numbering in the billions of dollars.4
Although the class action has effectively cemented its place as a tool for
group litigation, it now faces a grave challenge to its effectiveness.5 In 2017, the
U.S. Supreme Court decided Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of
California, which held that California could not exercise specific personal
jurisdiction over the claims of nonresident plaintiffs because “all the conduct
giving rise to the nonresidents’ claims occurred” outside of California.6 BristolMyers, however, was not certified as a class action under California law, but
instead was a coordinated mass action in which over 600 plaintiffs sued together
under traditional joinder principles.7 As a result, Bristol-Myers did not expressly
answer whether and how its holding would apply to class actions.8 Nevertheless,
commentators did not hesitate in speculating that Bristol-Myers could require
that a court have personal jurisdiction over the claims of every member of a class
action.9
1

7A CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1751 (3d ed.

2020).
2
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 486 (1954) (noting the cases at issue are premised on “a common
legal question”).
3
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 120 (1973) (noting that a pregnant woman sued “‘on behalf of herself and
all other women’ similarly situated”).
4
See Andy Gillin, The Largest Class Action Lawsuits & Settlements, GJEL (Oct. 4, 2021), https://www.
gjel.com/blog/largest-class-action-settlements.html.
5
See Robert Channick & Becky Yerak, Supreme Court Ruling Could Make It Harder to File ClassAction Lawsuits Against Companies, CHI. TRIB. (June 22, 2017), https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ctsupreme-court-ruling-mass-actions-illinois-0625-biz-20170622-story.html (stating that class action lawsuits are
going to be “harder to bring and . . . harder to win” after Bristol-Myers).
6
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781–82 (2017).
7
See id. at 1778 (“A group of plaintiffs—consisting of 86 California residents and 592 residents from
33 other States—filed eight separate complaints . . . .”).
8
Id. at 1789 n.4 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
9
See Andrew J. Pincus, Archis A. Parasharami & Matt Waring, Supreme Court’s Decision in BristolMyers Squibb v. Superior Court Rejects Expansive View of Specific Jurisdiction, CLASS DEF. BLOG (June 19,
2017), https://www.classdefenseblog.com/2017/06/supreme-courts-decision-bristol-myers-squibb-v-superiorcourt-rejects-expansive-view-specific-jurisdiction/; Channick & Yerak, supra note 5; Richard Levick, The Game
Changes: Is Bristol-Myers Squibb the End of an Era?, FORBES (July 11, 2017, 2:21 PM), https://www.forbes.
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On March 10, 2020, the D.C. Circuit decided Molock v. Whole Foods Market
Group, Inc.,10 which was the first federal court of appeals case raising the issue
of whether the Bristol-Myers rule applies to class actions. While the majority
opinion resolved the case on other grounds, Judge Silberman’s dissenting
opinion reached the Bristol-Myers issue and concluded that Bristol-Myers
should apply to class actions.11 The very next day, the Seventh Circuit reached
the opposite conclusion in Mussat v. IQVIA, Inc.12 It is likely that this issue will
continue to be addressed in federal courts of appeals and may eventually reach
the U.S. Supreme Court.13
This Comment argues that the holding of Bristol-Myers should not extend to
the class action context. The class action is a unique form of litigation with builtin protections to ensure that the due process rights of all parties are protected.14
There are significant, compelling differences between class action members and
mass action plaintiffs that justify different standards for personal jurisdiction
over their claims.15 Furthermore, application of Bristol-Myers to class actions
would contravene the very policy purposes that the class action device serves
and could render class actions ineffective.16 Without an effective class action
tool available, litigants may be forced to inefficiently litigate the same issues in
multiple jurisdictions and may obtain inconsistent judgments resolving those
issues.17
Part I of this Comment examines the history and background of the class
action device and traces its development to its modern form. It then discusses
the three main policy purposes of class actions: (1) to promote judicial
efficiency, (2) to ensure victims can be adequately compensated, and (3) to
provide a means for deterring wrongdoing.

com/sites/richardlevick/2017/07/11/the-game-changes-is-bristol-myers-squibb-the-end-of-anera/#7488e95c2e83.
10
952 F.3d 293, 295 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
11
Id. at 301 (Silberman, J., dissenting).
12
953 F.3d 441, 443 (7th Cir. 2020).
13
Wystan M. Ackerman, Does Bristol-Myers Squibb Apply to Class Actions? D.C. and Seventh Circuit
Issue New Decisions, NAT’L L. REV. (Mar. 12, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/does-bristolmyers-squibb-apply-to-class-actions-dc-and-seventh-circuit-issue-new.
14
Linda S. Mullenix, Dubious Doctrines: The Quasi-Class Action, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 389, 417 (2011).
15
Mussat, 953 F.3d at 446–48.
16
Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 551 (1974).
17
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A) (noting class actions may be certified when separate, individual actions
would “create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that would
establish incompatible standards of conduct”).
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Part II explores the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction jurisprudence.
First, it discusses the modern framework for personal jurisdiction established by
International Shoe Co. v. Washington.18 Then, it provides an overview of the
evolution of personal jurisdiction from 1945 to the present. Finally, this Part
describes the Bristol-Myers opinion in detail.
Part III thoroughly examines Judge Silberman’s dissent in Molock and the
Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Mussat, analyzing the arguments made in each
opinion.
Part IV proceeds in four sections. Section A argues that applying BristolMyers to class actions would contradict the widespread consensus on this issue
pre-Bristol-Myers, resulting in a groundbreaking shift in the law not justified by
the text of Bristol-Myers. Section B highlights the differences between class
actions and mass actions of the type at issue in Bristol-Myers and argues that
these differences between class members and mass action plaintiffs are sufficient
to distinguish the two for personal jurisdiction purposes. Section C argues that
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which governs class action procedure,
provides sufficient due process protections to defendants in class actions,
ensuring that defendants are not unfairly harmed by not applying Bristol-Myers
to class actions. Lastly, section D discusses the policy implications of extending
Bristol-Myers to class actions and argues that the goals of the class action device
would be impaired if Bristol-Myers were applied to class actions.
Finally, Part V addresses the broad implications that extending the holding
of Bristol-Myers to class actions would have on the litigation system as a whole.
This Part concludes that, in conjunction with the Court’s continued narrowing
of personal jurisdiction, these implications could result in aggregate litigation
becoming unduly difficult, thus depriving society of the benefits that aggregate
litigation models such as class actions provide.
I.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN CLASS ACTION

To understand fully the complexities of how Bristol-Myers’s conception of
personal jurisdiction could apply to class actions, it is important to discuss and
understand general information regarding class actions. The class action is a
unique tool of aggregate litigation that functions quite differently from ordinary
litigation.19 In so doing, it plays an important role in the judicial system as a
vehicle by which large classes of injured parties with substantially similar claims
18
19

326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
Mussat, 953 F.3d at 446–47.
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can seek recovery for their injuries.20 Section A of this Part provides a brief
background of the historical origins and development of class actions in the
United States. Section B examines the most important policy purposes that class
actions serve.
A. The Beginnings of the Class Action
Class action litigation was introduced as a feature of American jurisprudence
by Justice Joseph Story through his 1820 opinion in West v. Randall.21 Justice
Story’s analysis was first adopted by the Supreme Court in Smith v.
Swormstedt,22 which permitted a class suit to be brought on behalf of a group of
preachers seeking a declaration of the rights that each sectional group of the
Methodist Episcopal Church of the United States had regarding funds belonging
to the church.23 Story’s writings also prompted the Supreme Court to promulgate
Equity Rule 48,24 which provided a cause of action for group representative
litigation.25 In 1938, this rule was modernized and adopted into Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23.26 While the new Rule 23 was “a substantial restatement” of
the former Rule, it modernized the old Rule by more clearly defining what
constituted a “common or general interest” capable of affording a similarlysituated class of persons a right of action.27 An increasingly industrialized and
developed economy demanded a more robust tool for class actions, and Rule 23
was seen as a necessary mechanism to promote the use of class actions.28 The
original Rule 23 divided class actions into three vague categories based upon the
character of the right asserted: (1) “true” class actions involving “joint, common
20

See Mullenix, supra note 14, at 417.
29 F. Cas. 718, 721 (C.C.D.R.I. 1820) (“It is a general rule in equity, that all persons materially
interested, either as plaintiffs or defendants in the subject matter of the bill ought to be made parties to the suit,
however numerous they may be.”).
22
57 U.S. 288 (1853).
23
Id. at 302.
24
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1. The original Equity Rule 48 was later replaced by Equity Rule 38.
Id.
25
Id. Rule 38 altered procedure:
21

In the former rules there was no provision requiring that every action should be prosecuted in the
name of the real party in interest. When the question is of common or general interest to many
persons constituting a class so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the
court, one or more may sue or defend for the whole.
Robert E. Bunker, The New Federal Equity Rules, 11 MICH. L. REV. 435, 448 (1913).
26
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1937 adoption (“This is a substantial restatement
of former Equity Rule 38 . . . .”) (alterations omitted).
27
See id. (“The rule adopts the test of former Equity Rule 38, but defines what constitutes ‘a common or
general interest.’” (alterations omitted)).
28
See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 1752.
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or secondary rights,” (2) “hybrid” class actions involving “rights related to
‘specific property,’” and (3) “spurious” class actions involving “rights affected
by a common question and related to common relief.”29
This original 1938 version of Rule 23 proved to be “obscure and uncertain,”
and was thus replaced in 1966 by a rule that described “in more practical terms
the occasions for maintaining class actions.”30 The revised rule ushered in the
modern era of class action litigation in the United States.31 The new rule
proclaimed that judgments in class actions were final as to all members of the
class and set forth the modern requirements for certifying a class action.32 While
courts initially remained cautious about certifying class actions, class actions
eventually became much more widespread and effective by the mid-1980s.33
Under Rule 23 as it stands today, a class action must meet each of the four
prerequisites stated in Rule 23(a) and at least one of the bases set forth in Rule
23(b).34 The 23(a) requirements are commonly referred to as the elements of
“numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequate representation.”35
Assuming each of the four Rule 23(a) requirements are met, a putative class
action must then comport with at least one of the three types of class actions laid

29
FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment. The class action categories provided
in the original Rule 23 were the following:

(1) joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner of a primary right refuses to enforce
that right and a member of the class thereby becomes entitled to enforce it;
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims which do or may affect
specific property involved in the action; or
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several rights and a
common relief is sought.
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 1752.
30
FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment.
31
See Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH U. L. REV. 729, 736 (2013) (“Modern
Rule 23 . . . originated in 1966 . . . .”).
32
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment (“The amended rule . . . provides
that all class actions maintained to the end as such will result in judgments including those whom the court finds
to be members of the class.”).
33
Klonoff, supra note 31, at 736.
34
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)–(b). Rule 23(a) states the following:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all
members only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2)
there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
Id.
35

E.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 349 (2011).
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out in Rule 23(b).36 The first type of class action identified in Rule 23(b)(1)37 is
the “prejudice” class action. These actions comprise claims “made by numerous
persons against a fund insufficient to satisfy all claims.”38 This type of class
action may be brought when (1) separate actions would create inconsistent
standards among the members of the class, or (2) separate actions would impede
the interests of class members not party to the individual action.39 The second
type of class action identified, a Rule 23(b)(2) class action, may be brought when
a class is seeking injunctive or declaratory relief.40 Third and finally, Rule
23(b)(3) permits a class action to be maintained when (1) issues common to the
class predominate over individual issues, and (2) a class action would be the
most efficient means of adjudicating the case.41 If the class action falls within
one of these categories and Rule 23(a) is satisfied, then the court may determine
by order to certify the case as a class action.42
B. Policy Purposes of Class Actions
Class actions are “an important and valuable part of the legal system”43 for
multiple reasons. First, a “principal purpose” of the class action is to promote
36

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b). The rule states the following:
A class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if
(1) prosecuting separate actions by or against individual class members would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that
would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class; or (B)
adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as a practical matter, would be
dispositive of their interests of the other members not parties to the individual adjudications
or would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests;
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to
the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate
respecting the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over
any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. The matters
pertinent to these findings include: (A) the class members’ interests in individually
controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any
litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members; (C) the
desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular
forum; and (D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.

Id.
37
38
39
40
41
42
43

Id. at (b)(1).
Id. advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment.
Id. at (b)(1)(a)–(b).
Id. at (b)(2).
Id. at (b)(3).
Id. at (c)(1)(A).
Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. § 1711(a)(1).
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efficiency and judicial economy.44 Second, class actions serve the purpose of
ensuring that plaintiffs with small claims have the ability to obtain recovery for
their injuries.45 Finally, class actions prevent defendants from being able to
escape liability for their harms for the mere reason that it would not be
economical for a singular injured party to bring suit.46 The relationship between
these policy goals and the overarching question of whether Bristol-Myers should
apply to class actions is discussed in Part IV.D.
1. Judicial Efficiency
By aggregating individuals’ claims into a single lawsuit, class actions “avoid
. . . unnecessary filing of repetitious papers and motions,”47 saving both time and
“the enormous costs of piecemeal litigation.”48 Without the class action device,
courts would be faced with “days of the same witnesses, exhibits and issues from
trial to trial.”49 Devoting “the efforts of judges, clerks, witnesses,” and jurors to
“repeated examination of the issues raised by a single transaction” would be a
waste.50 Class actions serve a significant benefit in “[saving] the resources of
both the courts and the parties by permitting an issue potentially affecting every
[class member] to be litigated in an economical fashion under Rule 23.”51 Class
actions also prevent the possibility of inconsistent judgments among various
claims brought by individual plaintiffs.52 Consistent judgments not only ensure
that similarly situated claimants are treated equally, but also help to maintain
public confidence in the integrity of the court system.53 Thus, class actions
further the judicial system’s preference for similar issues of law and fact to be
efficiently resolved in the same way with respect to each claimant.54

44

Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 553 (1974).
See Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) (“[A]ggrieved persons may be
without effective redress unless they may employ the class-action device.”).
46
See Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting “the class action [was]
more likely to proceed, thereby helping to deter future violations”).
47
Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 550.
48
Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 860 (1999).
49
Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 473 (5th Cir. 1986).
50
John C. McCoid, A Single Package for Multiparty Disputes, 28 STAN. L. REV. 707, 707 (1976).
51
Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 701 (1979).
52
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A) (noting class actions may be certified when separate, individual actions
would “create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that would
establish incompatible standards of conduct”).
53
Louen v. Twedt, No. CV-F-04-6556, 2007 WL 2688851, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2007).
54
See Sueoka v. United States, 101 F. App’x 649, 654–55 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Addressing [a claim] in a
single, rather than multiple, action, is the preferable approach . . . .”).
45
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2. Compensation of Victims
Another purpose that class actions serve is to allow plaintiffs with small
claims to obtain recovery through a negative value suit.55 A negative value class
action is made up of a multitude of individual claims of very small value.56
Without the class action tool available, negative value plaintiffs would have no
incentive to pursue time-intensive and costly litigation.57 Moreover, even if a
plaintiff wanted to pursue the case, he would have difficulty finding a competent
attorney to take the case when the potential payoff is minimal.58 The class action
tool provides a unique solution to this problem by “aggregating the relatively
paltry potential recoveries into something worth someone’s (usually an
attorney’s) labor.”59 Thus, class actions allow a large number of plaintiffs whose
individual claims are very small to combine their claims into one lawsuit,
enabling each of them to recover.60
3. Deterrence
While ensuring recovery of what will often be minimal damages may not
seem like a compelling priority for the legal system, allowing recovery serves
deterrence interests by ensuring that defendants cannot escape liability simply
because no plaintiff has incentive to sue.61 Without the availability of a class
action, defendants who cause small but widespread harm to a large number of
people would likely not have to compensate their victims.62 A class action,
however, could result in defendants’ being forced to pay a large sum of
compensatory damages consisting of small payments to many plaintiffs, which
would “have a potent deterrent effect.”63 Thus, the class action structure is
critical in that it encourages defendants “to take greater care in the future to
comply” with the law.64

55
See Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) (“[A]ggrieved persons may be
without effective redress unless they may employ the class-action device.”).
56
See RICHARD D. FREER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 816 (4th ed. 2017).
57
See Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[S]mall recoveries do not
provide the incentive for an individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights.”).
58
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 161 (1974).
59
Mace, 109 F.3d at 344.
60
Id.
61
See id. (noting a class action “help[s] to deter future violations”).
62
See FREER, supra note 56, at 816.
63
Globus v. L. Rsch. Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1285 (2d Cir. 1969).
64
Hughes v. Kore of Ind. Enter., 731 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2013).
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II. THE SUPREME COURT’S PERSONAL JURISDICTION JURISPRUDENCE
Under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause,65 courts must have
jurisdiction over the defendant to render binding judgments that resolve a case.66
Courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant when the defendant
is served process while in the forum state,67 does not object to the exercise of
jurisdiction,68 or has “certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.’”69 This personal jurisdiction requirement serves two main
purposes. First, it “protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a
distant or inconvenient forum.”70 Second, it promotes federalism by ensuring
that states do not exceed “the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal
sovereigns in a federal system.”71

65
Although the personal jurisdiction powers of federal courts are constitutionally limited by the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, Rule 4(k) authorizes personal jurisdiction only to the extent that a state court
in the state where the federal court is located would have personal jurisdiction. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A). As a
result, the Fourteenth Amendment generally governs the limits on federal courts’ exercise of personal
jurisdiction. See A. Benjamin Spencer, The Territorial Reach of Federal Courts, 71 FLA. L. REV. 979, 985 n.33,
986–87, 996 (2019) (stating “federal courts have been largely confined to the jurisdictional reach of their host
states”).
66
See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1878) (“[T]he validity of such judgments may be directly
questioned . . . on the ground that proceedings in a court of justice to determine the personal rights and obligations
of parties over whom that court has no jurisdiction do not constitute due process of law.”).
67
See Burnham v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990) (plurality opinion); id. at 628–29
(Brennan, J., concurring).
68
See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(1)(B) (noting a party waives its personal jurisdiction defense by failing to
make it in a motion or raise it in a responsive pleading).
69
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940)).
70
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
71
Id.; see also Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958) (stating personal jurisdiction restrictions
“are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States”). The relevance of interstate
federalism in personal jurisdiction disputes has been subject to inconsistent interpretation by the Supreme Court.
Just two years after World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court stated the following:

The restriction on state sovereign power described in World-Wide Volkswagen . . . must be seen
as ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause.
That Clause is the only source of the personal jurisdiction requirement and the Clause itself makes
no mention of federalism concerns.
Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 n.10 (1982). Nevertheless, the Court’s
decisions have continued to recognize interstate federalism as an important principle underlying personal
jurisdiction protections. See, e.g., J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 884 (2011) (plurality
opinion) (“[I]f another State were to assert jurisdiction in an inappropriate case, it would upset the federal
balance, which posits that each State has a sovereignty that is not subject to unlawful intrusion by other States.”).
This federalism rationale was principally relied upon by the Court in Bristol-Myers. See Bristol-Myers Squibb
Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017).
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Of course, to assess how personal jurisdiction requirements should be
applied to the unique setting of a class action, a discussion of the underlying
framework and development of personal jurisdiction doctrine is necessary.
Section A of this Part discusses the beginnings of the modern understanding of
personal jurisdiction, including the famous 1945 case, International Shoe Co. v.
Washington. Section B examines the Court’s gradual narrowing of personal
jurisdiction post-International Shoe and offers context for the Bristol-Myers
decision. Section C analyzes Bristol-Myers itself and introduces the resulting
personal jurisdiction problem in the class action context.
A. Establishing the Modern Personal Jurisdiction Framework
Under the traditional approach to personal jurisdiction that predominated in
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, proper exercise of personal
jurisdiction required serving process on a defendant physically located in the
state.72 In the foundational case of International Shoe, the Court departed from
the traditional approach. The International Shoe Court introduced the concept
of “minimum contacts” as the primary test for determining whether the exercise
of jurisdiction comported with due process.73 In its decision, the Court
introduced a distinction between two types of personal jurisdiction,74 referred to
today as “general jurisdiction” and “specific jurisdiction.”75
General jurisdiction is exercised when a defendant is made to answer for
claims that are entirely unrelated to that defendant’s activities in the state in
which the claim is brought.76 As described by the Court in International Shoe, a
court may exercise general jurisdiction over a defendant based upon that
defendant’s continuous and systematic activities in the forum state.77 The Court
defines continuous and systematic activities as activities “so substantial and of
such a nature as to justify suit against [the defendant] on causes of action arising
from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.”78 General jurisdiction may
be conferred through the traditional methods of in-state service of process79 and
consent, because these methods permit jurisdiction over causes of action that do
72

See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 724 (1878).
Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
74
See id. at 318.
75
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 923–24 (2011).
76
See id.
77
Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318.
78
Id.
79
This form of jurisdiction applies to individuals served process in a state, but under current law, does
not apply to corporations whose officers are served process in a state. Cody J. Jacobs, If Corporations are People,
Why Can’t They Play Tag?, 46 N.M. L. REV. 1, 2 (2016).
73
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not arise from the defendant’s contacts with the forum state.80 In addition,
general jurisdiction may be exercised when the defendant is domiciled in the
forum state.81
In contrast, specific jurisdiction may be exercised over a defendant when the
claim is related to the defendant’s activities in the forum state, regardless of
whether the contacts are widespread or minimal.82 As the Court in International
Shoe described, some activities “because of their nature and quality and the
circumstances of their commission, may be deemed sufficient,” regardless of
whether the activities are continuous and systematic.83 In these instances, the
defendant’s activities are such that the defendant is said to have “minimum
contacts” with the forum state, and it is always sufficient for that state to exercise
jurisdiction over the defendant.84
B. The Gradual Narrowing of Personal Jurisdiction
The limits of a court’s exercise of both general and specific jurisdiction over
defendants has been narrowed significantly by the Supreme Court in the years
since International Shoe was decided seventy-five years ago. Today, the Court
has effectively replaced its original standards of personal jurisdiction with a
narrower, rule-based approach that more clearly delineates when personal
jurisdiction may and may not be exercised.85 The “continuous and systematic”
test has been replaced by an at home standard to establish general jurisdiction,86
and the Court has introduced additional metrics for determining whether specific
jurisdiction is appropriate.
The first case that significantly narrowed the Court’s conception of general
jurisdiction was the Court’s 1984 decision in Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall.87 In Helicopteros, the defendant, over an eight year
period, purchased products and accessories from the forum state and sent
prospective employees to the forum state for training.88 The Court concluded
80
See Burnham v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990) (plurality opinion) (concluding
“jurisdiction based on physical presence alone” is sufficient regardless of the defendant’s minimum contacts);
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(1)(B) (determining whether a party is considered to have consented to personal jurisdiction
does not require consideration of contacts with the forum state).
81
Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924.
82
Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318–19.
83
Id. at 318.
84
Id. at 316–18.
85
See, e.g., Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924.
86
Id.
87
466 U.S. 408, 415–16, 418 (1984).
88
Id. at 411.
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that these contacts did not constitute “the kind of continuous and systematic
general business contacts” that would subject the defendant to general
jurisdiction.89 In supporting its conclusion, the Court contrasted “purchases and
related trips, standing alone” with activities such as applying for a business
license, “establish[ing] a place of business,” and “regularly [carrying] on
business” in the forum state.90 This decision constituted a significant contraction
of the Court’s general jurisdiction doctrine, as the Court had previously
permitted broad exercise of general jurisdiction under International Shoe’s
“continuous and systematic standard,” even suggesting that a defendant with
nationwide contacts could be subject to general jurisdiction almost anywhere.91
The Court decided Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown in
2011,92 and Daimler AG v. Bauman three years later.93 In these cases, the Court
fashioned a new standard for when general jurisdiction may be exercised over a
corporation.94 In Goodyear, the Court found that courts may exercise general
jurisdiction over corporate defendants when their contacts with the forum state
are “so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home” in
that state.95 In Daimler, the Court clarified further that a corporation’s “place of
incorporation and principal place of business are [the] ‘paradigm . . . bases’” for
when a corporation is “fairly regarded as at home.”96 This shift marked a
sweeping restriction on general jurisdiction, as large national corporations that
once could have been subject to general jurisdiction in a number of states are
now subject to general jurisdiction only in the few forums where they are
“essentially at home.”97
The Supreme Court has also narrowed the scope of courts’ ability to exercise
specific jurisdiction over both individuals and corporate defendants, beginning

89

Id. at 415–16.
Id. at 417.
91
See id. at 415–16.
92
564 U.S. 915 (2011).
93
571 U.S. 117 (2014).
94
See Goodyear, 564 U.S at 919; Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137.
95
Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945)).
96
Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137 (alterations omitted) (citations omitted).
97
Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919. Initially, the Court did not categorically limit general jurisdiction to the
“paradigm” states. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137 (“Goodyear did not hold that a corporation may be subject to
general jurisdiction only in a forum where it is incorporated or has its principal place of business . . . .”). However,
since establishing the at home standard, the Court has yet to subject a corporation to general jurisdiction unless
one of the paradigm bases is satisfied. See BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1560 (2017) (Sotomayor,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[I]t is virtually inconceivable that . . . corporations will ever be
subject to general jurisdiction in any location other than their principal places of business or of incorporation.”).
90
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with Hanson v. Denckla98 in 1958. In Hanson, the Court added to the “certain
minimum contacts” requirement from International Shoe99 that “there be some
act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws.”100 In other words, the unilateral activity of a third party
“cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State,” and the
defendant itself must purposefully act in the forum state.101 Activities by
defendants that have been found to constitute purposeful availment of specific
jurisdiction include soliciting business in the forum state,102 purposefully
distributing a product in the forum state,103 committing an out-of-state tortious
act that causes harmful effects in the forum state,104 and initiating a contractual
relationship with a party in the forum state.105
Another limitation on the exercise of specific jurisdiction is the requirement
that events giving rise to a claim must “relate[] to or ‘arise[] out of’” the
defendant’s contacts with the forum state.106 Minimum contacts and purposeful
availment alone are not sufficient; for specific jurisdiction to be exercised
consistent with due process, the Court has held that “the defendant’s suit-related
conduct must create a substantial connection with the forum State.”107 The
precise extent of relatedness required between the defendant’s contacts and the
events giving rise to the claim generated multiple proposed tests in the lower
courts.108 In 2021, however, the Supreme Court declined to further constrain
98

357 U.S. 235, 251–54 (1958).
Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
100
Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253 (citation omitted).
101
Id.; see also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980) (rejecting assertion
of specific jurisdiction in Oklahoma over a New York defendant who carried on no business activities in
Oklahoma). Furthermore, the plurality opinion in J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro found that purposeful
availment of the United States as a whole was insufficient—defendants must purposefully avail themselves of
the forum state itself for personal jurisdiction to be exercised. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873,
886 (2011) (plurality opinion).
102
McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957); see also Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251–52
(distinguishing McGee on the basis that the defendant in McGee solicited an insurance agreement with a resident
of the forum state, which was a sufficient contact to support jurisdiction).
103
Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774–75 (1984).
104
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788–90 (1984).
105
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 487 (1985).
106
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984) (citation omitted).
107
Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284 (2014).
108
Compare Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 443 P.3d 407, 416 (Mont. 2019), aff’d, 141
S. Ct. 1017, 1026 (2021) (holding that relatedness is met when a “nexus” exists between the injury and the
defendant’s in-state activity and the defendant could have reasonably foreseen the injury occurring in the state),
with Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 585, 588 (Tex. 2007) (holding that “there must be
a substantial connection between [defendant’s] contacts and the operative facts of the litigation,” and that instate advertising is not a sufficient link to satisfy this test). See generally Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 579–85
99
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specific jurisdiction, holding that a direct causal link between the defendant’s
conduct and the plaintiff’s claims is not required to show relatedness.109 Instead,
the “arise out of or relate to” formulation “contemplates that some relationships
will support jurisdiction without a causal showing.”110 Nevertheless, “the phrase
‘relate to’ incorporates real limits,”111 as the “relationship among the defendant,
the forum, and the litigation” must be strong enough to support specific
jurisdiction.112
Finally, even when minimum contacts, purposeful availment, and
relatedness have been shown, a court must ensure that the assertion of
jurisdiction over the defendant comports with “traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.”113 In Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,114 the Court
listed five factors for courts to consider in determining whether it would be fair
to subject the defendant to jurisdiction: (1) “the burden on the defendant,” (2)
“the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute,” (3) “the plaintiff’s
interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief,” (4) “the interstate judicial
system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies,” and
(5) “the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental
substantive social policies.”115
Application of these factors can both “serve to establish the reasonableness
of jurisdiction upon a lesser showing of minimum contacts than would otherwise
be required” and “defeat the reasonableness of jurisdiction even if the defendant
has purposefully engaged in forum activities.”116 The purpose of this additional
requirement is to prevent personal jurisdiction rules from “[making] litigation
‘so gravely difficult and inconvenient’ that a party unfairly is at a ‘severe
disadvantage’ in comparison to his opponent.”117 This “fairness” inquiry, along
with the narrowing of general jurisdiction and the addition of the “purposeful
availment” and “relatedness” requirements, demonstrate the additional

(describing other relatedness tests applied by various courts).
109
Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1026 (2021).
110
Id. (citation omitted).
111
Id.
112
Id. at 15 (citation omitted).
113
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940)).
114
471 U.S. 462 (1985).
115
Id. at 476–77 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)).
116
Id. at 477–78.
117
Id. at 478 (quoting Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 18 (1972); McGee v. Int’l Life Ins.
Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223–24 (1957)).
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constraints that the Court placed on personal jurisdiction after International
Shoe and leading up to Bristol-Myers.118
C. The Bristol-Myers Decision
In Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, the Court
continued to narrow its personal jurisdiction doctrine by holding that, in a mass
tort action, a court must have personal jurisdiction over a defendant with respect
to the claims of every plaintiff.119 In Bristol-Myers, 678 plaintiffs, including 86
California residents and 592 residents of thirty-three other states, filed a mass
tort suit against defendant Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. (BMS) in California
Superior Court.120 Asserting thirteen claims under California law, the plaintiffs
alleged that they were injured by taking Plavix, a prescription drug manufactured
and sold by BMS.121 The non-California plaintiffs did not claim to have acquired
Plavix from “California physicians or . . . any other California source,” or that
they were injured or treated for their injuries in California.122 Furthermore,
“BMS did not develop Plavix in California, did not create a marketing strategy
for Plavix in California, and did not manufacture, label, package, or work on the
regulatory approval of the product in California.”123
BMS was incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in
New York, and “maintain[ed] substantial operations in New York and New
Jersey,” where Plavix was developed and produced.124 However, BMS engaged
in activities in California, five research facilities were located in the state, and
about 400 company employees were located there.125 At the time of the case,
BMS had sold about 187 million Plavix pills in California, generating over $900
million in revenue.126
BMS asserted a lack of personal jurisdiction with respect to the nonresidents’
claims in the California Superior Court.127 The court denied the motion, finding
that BMS was subject to general jurisdiction due to its “extensive activities” in
California.128 In light of Daimler AG v. Bauman, which confined general
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128

See id. at 477–78.
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781–82 (2017).
Id. at 1778.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1777–78.
Id. at 1778.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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jurisdiction to fora in which the defendant can be “fairly regarded as at home,”129
the California Court of Appeal reversed the California Superior Court with
respect to general jurisdiction because BMS neither was incorporated in
California nor had its principal place of business in California.130 Nonetheless,
the California Court of Appeal found that California had specific jurisdiction
over the nonresidents’ claims by virtue of BMS’s “extensive, longstanding
business activities in California,” which were “far more than the minimum
contacts necessary.”131
The Supreme Court of California affirmed the finding of specific
jurisdiction.132 The court found that BMS, through its extensive activities in
California, clearly had minimum contacts with the state and had purposefully
availed itself of the benefits and protection of the state.133 With respect to
relatedness, the court applied a “sliding scale approach to specific jurisdiction”
in which “the more wide ranging the defendant’s forum contacts, the more
readily is shown a connection between the forum contacts and the claim.”134
Under this test, the court determined that “BMS’s extensive contacts with
California establish minimum contacts based on a less direct connection
between BMS’s forum activities and plaintiffs’ claims than might otherwise be
required.”135
In an 8–1 decision authored by Justice Alito, the U.S. Supreme Court
reversed the Supreme Court of California,136 stating that “settled principles
regarding specific jurisdiction control this case.”137 The Court based its analysis
in federalism, emphasizing that restrictions on the exercise of personal
jurisdiction are essential to ensure state sovereignty.138 As the Court stated,
“States retain many essential attributes of sovereignty, including, in particular,
the sovereign power to try causes in their courts. The sovereignty of each state

129

Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014) (citation omitted).
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct., 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 412, 424 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014).
131
Id. at 433.
132
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct., 377 P.3d 874, 894 (Cal. 2016).
133
Id. at 886.
134
Id. at 889 (citation omitted). But see Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 583–84
(Tex. 2007) (describing and rejecting the “sliding scale” approach).
135
Bristol-Myers, 377 P.3d at 889.
136
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1784 (2017).
137
Id. at 1781.
138
See id. at 1780 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958)); see also id. at 1788 (Sotomayor,
J., dissenting) (“The majority’s animating concern, in the end, appears to be federalism: ‘[T]erritorial limitations
on the power of the respective States.’”).
130
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. . . implies a limitation on the sovereignty of all its sister States.”139 The Court
went so far as to state that “at times, this federalism interest may be decisive.”140
The Court then rejected the “sliding scale” test as insufficient to show that
the claims relate to BMS’s contacts in California.141 The nonresident plaintiffs
“were not prescribed Plavix in California, did not purchase Plavix in California,
did not ingest Plavix in California, and were not injured by Plavix in
California.”142 As a result, there was no “adequate link” between the nonresident
plaintiffs and California; the “mere fact that other plaintiffs were . . . [injured]
in California” does not support jurisdiction over the nonresident plaintiffs’
claims.143 Because “[t]he relevant plaintiffs are not California residents and do
not claim to have suffered harm in that State,” the Court rejected the Supreme
Court of California’s “sliding scale” relatedness test as constitutionally
inadequate.144 The Court noted that the nonresident plaintiffs could bring an
action against BMS in a state that has general jurisdiction, which in this case
would have been Delaware and New York.145 Additionally, the Court recognized
that plaintiffs from each individual state could sue BMS in that state.146 Justice
Alito’s majority opinion did not mention or apply the Burger King fairness
factors.147
Justice Sotomayor dissented and would have found that California could
exercise specific jurisdiction over BMS with respect to the nonresidents’
claims.148 Justice Sotomayor argued that the claims “relate[d] to” BMS’s
contacts with California because BMS advertised and distributed the drugs
across all fifty states, and each plaintiff alleged injury by the “same essential
acts” undertaken by BMS.149 Furthermore, it would be reasonable and consistent
with a fairness analysis to subject BMS to specific jurisdiction in California.150

139
Id. at 1780 (majority opinion) (alterations omitted) (citing World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286, 293 (1980)).
140
Id.
141
Id. at 1781.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id. at 1782.
145
Id. at 1783.
146
Id. (“[T]he plaintiffs who are residents of a particular state—for example, the 92 plaintiffs from Texas
and the 71 from Ohio—could probably sue together in their home States.”).
147
See Matthew P. Demartini, Comment, Stepping Back to Move Forward: Expanding Personal
Jurisdiction by Reviving Old Practices, 67 EMORY L.J. 809, 837–38 (2018) (noting the Bristol-Myers opinion
took an exclusively contacts-focused approach at the expense of fairness).
148
Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1786 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
149
Id.
150
Id. at 1786–87.
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Justice Sotomayor expressed concerns about the effects of the Court’s decision,
noting that the Court’s rule “forces injured plaintiffs to bear the burden of
bringing suit in what will often be far flung jurisdictions.”151 Moreover, Justice
Sotomayor argued that the Court’s rule “will make it difficult to aggregate the
claims of plaintiffs across the country whose claims may be worth little alone,”
“will make it impossible to bring a nationwide mass action in state court against
defendants who are ‘at home’ in different States,” and “will result in piecemeal
litigation and the bifurcation of claims.”152
Most importantly, Justice Sotomayor noted that the majority opinion did not
resolve the question of whether its holding would apply to a class action suit.153
In addition, during oral argument, multiple justices raised the issue of how the
case may relate to class actions.154 Bristol-Myers was a mass tort action “in
which hundreds of plaintiffs joined together in court but maintained their
identity as individual parties.”155 In a mass action, “each plaintiff is a real party
in interest” and therefore must individually effect service and file claims in a
forum in which the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction.156 Unlike class
actions, each plaintiff in a mass action is “personally named” in the complaint
and must independently make out their own claim.157 In a class action, by
contrast, a small number of representatives represent the interests of the
unnamed, absent class members.158 Moreover, mass actions do not need to
satisfy the procedural hurdles of Rule 23 to be certified by the court.159 Whether
these differences should distinguish class actions from mass actions with regard
to personal jurisdiction requirements remained unresolved in Bristol-Myers.
This ongoing question forms the basis of this Comment.

151

Id. at 1789.
Id. at 1784.
153
Id. at 1789 n.4.
154
Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, 42, Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct.
1773 (2017) (No. 16-466) (Breyer, J.) (“[W]hat do we do to . . . the class actions . . . ?”) (Ginsburg, J.) (“[C]ould
the Plavix claim have been brought as a class action?”).
155
Daniel Wilf-Townsend, Did Bristol-Myers Squibb Kill the Nationwide Class Action?, 129 YALE L.J.
F. 205, 210 (2019).
156
Sanchez v. Launch Tech. Workforce Sols., LLC, 297 F. Supp. 3d 1360, 1365 (N.D. Ga. 2018).
157
See id. at 1365–66 (“[A] mass action . . . may—and likely would—present significant variations in the
plaintiffs’ claims . . . . “).
158
Id. at 1365.
159
See Jones v. Depuy Synthes Prods., Inc., 330 F.R.D. 298, 312 (N.D. Ala. 2018) (distinguishing mass
actions from class actions on the grounds that “the certification procedures set forth in Rule 23 . . . protect absent
class members’ due process rights”).
152
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III. THE DIFFERENCE OF OPINION FORMS
Almost immediately, commentators began to ponder whether Bristol-Myers
would require a court to have personal jurisdiction over a class action defendant
with respect to all class members. The very same day that Bristol-Myers was
decided, renowned litigator Andrew J. Pincus160 speculated that Bristol-Myers
would have a significant impact on class action litigation, noting that BristolMyers “provides class action defendants with powerful arguments to challenge
class actions filed in states that cannot exercise personal jurisdiction with respect
to absent class members’ claims.”161 Another article proclaimed that “the days
of a nationwide class action being filed against a California company in [Illinois]
. . . are over.”162 In another piece, the author noted that “[i]t remains to be seen
how class actions will in turn be affected by Bristol-Myers” and predicted that
class action defendants would cite the decision in seeking dismissal of
nonresident class members.163
It did not take long for the issue of Bristol-Myers’s application to class
actions to be raised in the federal district courts.164 Three months after the
Supreme Court decided Bristol-Myers, a federal district court reached the merits
of Bristol-Myers’s application to class actions for the first time.165 Just a couple
of weeks later, a difference of opinion emerged among district courts.166 By
September 2019, fifty-six judges in twenty-four different districts had rendered
sixty-four federal district court decisions on the merits of Bristol-Myers’s
application to nationwide class actions.167 The large majority of these rulings

160
Andrew J. Pincus is an experienced litigator who has argued thirty cases in front of the U.S. Supreme
Court and frequently speaks and writes on legal issues, including class action law. See generally Andrew J.
Pincus, MAYER BROWN, https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/people/p/pincus-andrew-j?tab=overview (last
visited Nov. 11, 2021) (providing a brief summary of Mr. Pincus’s background).
161
Pincus et al., supra note 9.
162
Channick & Yerak, supra note 5.
163
Levick, supra note 9.
164
See, e.g., Fitzhenry-Russell v. Dr. Pepper Snapple Grp., Inc., No. 17-cv-00564, 2017 WL 4224723, at
*5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2017) (addressing Bristol-Myers’s application to class actions three months after BristolMyers was decided).
165
Id.
166
Compare id. at *5, *6 (refusing to extend Bristol-Myers to a nationwide class action in which each
named plaintiff was a California resident harmed in California, while eighty-eight percent of the total class
members were not California residents), with Wenokur v. AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co., No. CV-17-00165-PHX,
2017 WL 4357916, at *4 n.4 (D. Ariz. Oct. 2, 2017) (“The Court also notes that it lacks personal jurisdiction
over the claims of putative class members with no connection to Arizona and therefore would not be able to
certify a nationwide class.”). See generally Wilf-Townsend, supra note 155, at 229–37 (surveying district court
decisions on the application of Bristol-Myers to nationwide class actions between September 2017 and
September 2019).
167
Wilf-Townsend, supra note 155, at 212–13.
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declined to extend Bristol-Myers and permitted the class action to proceed; only
fourteen of the sixty-four rulings held that Bristol-Myers precluded specific
jurisdiction over the nonresident class members.168 However, it was not until
March 2020 that federal courts of appeals began issuing rulings on the issue.169
This Part will discuss the growing weight of authority that has answered the
question of whether Bristol-Myers applies to class actions, focusing in particular
on Molock v. Whole Foods Market Group, Inc.170 and Mussat v. IQVIA, Inc. 171
In these cases, a difference of opinion on the Bristol-Myers issue formed at the
federal appellate level.172
A. Molock v. Whole Foods Market Group, Inc.
The first federal appellate court to consider the question of whether BristolMyers applies to class actions was the D.C. Circuit. In Molock v. Whole Foods
Market Group, Inc., a group of current and former employees of Whole Foods
sought to bring a class action against Whole Foods in the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia.173 Plaintiffs, asserting diversity jurisdiction, brought
state law claims alleging that Whole Foods “manipulated its incentive-based
bonus programs, resulting in employees losing wages otherwise owed to
them.”174 Whole Foods is incorporated in Delaware and maintains its principal
place of business in Texas.175 Plaintiffs brought the case on behalf of themselves,
other employees of Whole Foods in the District of Columbia, and employees in
other states such as Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and
Virginia.176 Citing Bristol-Myers, Whole Foods moved to dismiss on grounds
that the district court did not have personal jurisdiction over it with respect to
the putative class members who were not employed in the District of
Columbia.177

168

Id. at 213.
See Mussat v. IQVIA, Inc., 953 F.3d 441, 447–49 (7th Cir. 2020) (declining to extend the holding of
Bristol-Myers to class actions).
170
952 F.3d 293, 295 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
171
953 F.3d at 443.
172
Compare Molock, 952 F.3d at 300–01 (Silberman, J., dissenting) (arguing the court should have
reached the Bristol-Myers issue and class claims unrelated to defendant’s contacts cannot proceed), with Mussat,
953 F.3d at 447–49 (holding that Bristol-Myers does not warrant a major change in the law of personal
jurisdiction and class actions).
173
952 F.3d at 295.
174
Id.
175
Id.
176
Molock v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 297 F. Supp. 3d 114, 120 (D.D.C. 2018).
177
Molock, 952 F.3d at 295–96.
169
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The district court sided with the plaintiffs and denied Whole Foods’ motion
to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.178 The court based its decision on
“the material distinctions between a class action and a mass tort action.”179
Specifically, the court noted that in a class action, named plaintiffs represent the
interests of the class members, whereas in mass tort actions, each plaintiff is a
“real party in interest.”180 In addition, the court reasoned that Rule 23’s
requirements for certification of a class action provide procedural safeguards
that do not apply in the context of a mass tort action.181 For these reasons, the
court denied Whole Foods’ motion.182
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit declined to reach the merits of the Bristol-Myers
issue.183 Instead, in a 2–1 decision, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court
on the basis that Whole Foods’ motion to dismiss the nonresident putative class
members was premature because the case had not been certified as a class action
under Rule 23.184 As the court articulated, class certification is the mechanism
by which unnamed class members are brought into the lawsuit and any personal
jurisdiction restrictions that may apply are not triggered until certification.185
Therefore, while the district court was correct to deny Whole Foods’ motion, it
did so for the wrong reason; the district court should not have ruled on the
Bristol-Myers issue because it was not yet ripe for review.186
While the majority did not express an opinion on the merits of the BristolMyers issue, Judge Silberman argued in his dissent that the court should have
reached the issue and found that the logic of Bristol-Myers does extend to class
actions.187 Judge Silberman would not have barred Whole Foods’ motion as
premature because (1) “the issue was forfeited by the plaintiffs by never raising
it below,”188 and (2) the motion sought dismissal of claims, not putative class

178

Molock, 297 F. Supp. 3d at 126–27.
Id. at 126.
180
Id. A “real party in interest” is simply a party that was named as such in the complaint. See id. In a
class action, only the named representatives are named in the complaint; class members are not named.
Fitzhenry-Russell v. Dr. Pepper Snapple Grp., Inc., No. 17-cv-00564, 2017 WL 4224723, at *5 (N.D. Cal Sept.
22, 2017).
181
Molock, 297 F. Supp. 3d at 126.
182
Id. at 126–27.
183
See Molock v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 952 F.3d 293, 295, 298 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
184
Id. at 295, 298.
185
Id. at 298.
186
See id. (“Any decision purporting to dismiss putative class members before [certification] would be
purely advisory.”).
187
Id. at 300–01 (Silberman, J., dissenting).
188
Id.
179
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members.189 Thus, the dissenting opinion would have confronted the BristolMyers issue as the district court did.190
Upon reaching the Bristol-Myers issue, Judge Silberman would have
reversed the district court and concluded that, while the Bristol-Myers Court did
not explicitly apply its holding to class actions, the logic of the Court’s decision
supports such an application.191 The dissent rejected the idea that the distinction
between class actions and mass tort actions is critical, arguing “a class action is
just a species of joinder, which ‘merely enables a federal court to adjudicate
claims of multiple parties at once, instead of in separate suits.’”192 The dissent
refuted the argument that Rule 23 provides adequate protections for due process,
noting “the Rule primarily focuses on the relationship between the claims of the
named representatives and the absent class members.”193 However, Judge
Silberman noted that the Court in Bristol-Myers did not allow the assertion of
personal jurisdiction on the basis that the plaintiffs’ claims were similar.194 To
adequately protect the defendant’s due process rights, Judge Silberman would
have applied “normal limits on personal jurisdiction,” rather than rely on any
inherent difference between class actions and mass actions.195
Furthermore, the dissent stated that the district court’s focus on whether the
class members were “real parties in interest” was misguided.196 Judge Silberman
argued that “[t]he Court’s focus in Bristol-Myers was on whether limits on
personal jurisdiction protect a defendant from out-of-state claims.”197 When a
court adjudicates a claim, it exercises binding authority on both parties. Thus,
Judge Silberman argued, a court that adjudicates claims of class members whose
claims do not arise out of the forum state exercises the same “coercive power
over a defendant” that it would in the case of plaintiffs in a mass action.198
Finally, Judge Silberman refuted the plaintiffs’ arguments that applying
Bristol-Myers in this context “would have a devastating impact on the viability
of class actions.”199 The dissent noted that a nationwide class action could be
189

Id. at 302.
See id. at 301, 305 (noting the Bristol-Myers question was “[t]he issue that actually divided the parties
below” and “the subject of the order that the district court certified”).
191
Id. at 306.
192
Id. (citation omitted).
193
Id. at 307.
194
Id. at 308.
195
Id.
196
See id. at 306–07 (“[T]he party status of absent class members seems to me to be irrelevant.”).
197
Id. at 307.
198
Id.
199
Id. at 309.
190
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filed in states in which the defendant is subject to general jurisdiction.200 Any
limits that would result from the application of Bristol-Myers to class actions,
Judge Silberman argued, are no different than limits on both mass actions and
suits by individual plaintiffs and “must be tolerated under current law.”201
B. Mussat v. IQVIA, Inc.
One day after the D.C. Circuit issued its decision in Molock, the Seventh
Circuit decided Mussat v. IQVIA, Inc.202 The representative in the case, Florence
Mussat, received a junk fax that did not include an opt-out notice as required
under federal law.203 The fax was sent by IQVIA, an organization incorporated
in Delaware and that maintained its principal place of business in
Pennsylvania.204 Plaintiffs sought to bring a nationwide class action in the
Northern District of Illinois on behalf of all other persons who had received the
junk faxes.205 Relying on Bristol-Myers, IQVIA sought to dismiss the putative
class members who had allegedly received a junk fax in a state other than
Illinois.206
The district court granted IQVIA’s motion,207 holding that Bristol-Myers
requires that a court have personal jurisdiction over the defendant with respect
to all class members, named and unnamed.208 The court reasoned that exercising
jurisdiction over IQVIA would violate its due process rights in that the
nonresidents’ claims regarding the junk faxes did not “arise out of or relate to”
the forum state of Illinois.209 Without relatedness, Bristol-Myers categorically
does not permit the exercise of specific jurisdiction, “[w]hether it be an
individual, mass, or class action.”210 Under the district court’s interpretation of
Bristol-Myers, “nationwide class actions in fora where the defendant is not
subject to general jurisdiction” cannot proceed.211

200
See id. at 305 (“It is worth noting that the plaintiffs could have avoided this whole personal jurisdiction
imbroglio simply by driving 110 miles down the road and filing this class action in Wilmington.”).
201
Id. at 310.
202
953 F.3d 441 (7th Cir. 2020).
203
Id. at 443.
204
Id.
205
Id.
206
Id.
207
Mussat v. IQVIA, Inc., No. 17 C 8841, 2018 WL 5311903, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2018).
208
Id. at *4.
209
Id. at *5.
210
Id.
211
Id.
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The Seventh Circuit unanimously reversed the district court, becoming the
first appellate court to issue binding law on the issue.212 The court noted that the
longstanding general consensus before Bristol-Myers was decided provided that
a court did not need to have specific jurisdiction over each member of a
nationwide class action.213 Because Bristol-Myers purported to be a mere
“straightforward application . . . of settled principles of personal jurisdiction,”214
the court argued that it was not intended to bring about such a drastic change in
class action procedure.215 The court also argued that the “critical distinction”
between mass actions and class actions precludes the application of BristolMyers in this case.216 The court noted that class members are not considered to
be full parties at interest when determining diversity jurisdiction and venue, and
thus should not be considered parties for the purposes of personal jurisdiction.217
C. Summary
Although there is not yet a full circuit split on the issue of whether BristolMyers applies to class actions, there is a clear division of opinion between Judge
Silberman’s dissent in Molock and the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Mussat. In
a third case, Cruson v. Jackson National Life Insurance Company,218 the Fifth
Circuit declined to reach the personal jurisdiction issue,219 holding instead that
because the defendant’s personal jurisdiction motion was not raised until after
the plaintiffs moved for class certification—and after the defendant had filed a
separate motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)—the defendant had not waived
any personal jurisdiction defense.220
Moreover, even though no court of appeals has yet held that Bristol-Myers
applies to class actions, numerous district courts have so held.221 It is likely that
federal courts of appeals will continue to confront this issue in the months and
212

Mussat v. IQVIA, Inc., 953 F.3d 441, 448–49 (7th Cir. 2020).
Id. at 445.
214
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1783 (2017).
215
See Mussat, 953 F.3d at 446 (stating that application of Bristol-Myers to nationwide class actions
“would have been far from the routine application of personal-jurisdiction rules that Bristol-Myers said it was
performing”).
216
Id. at 446–47.
217
Id. at 447.
218
954 F.3d 240 (5th Cir. 2020).
219
Id. at 247 n.4, 249 n.7 (describing the Bristol-Myers issue while giving no opinion on the merits).
220
Id. at 249–50.
221
See Mussat v. IQVIA, Inc, No. 17 C 8841, 2018 WL 5311903, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2018); Wenokur
v. AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co., No. CV-17-00165-PHX, 2017 WL 4357916, at *4 n.4 (D. Ariz. Oct. 2, 2017).
See generally Wilf-Townsend, supra note 155, at 229–37 (listing district court decisions holding that BristolMyers applies in the class action context).
213
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years to come.222 The Supreme Court could also address this issue at some point
in the near future.223 Bristol-Myers’s application to nationwide class actions is a
critical issue in the realm of complex litigation because it has the potential to
result in significant changes to the class action landscape through the limitation
of fora available to plaintiffs and the possibility of review by the Supreme Court.
IV. NONNAMED CLASS MEMBERS SHOULD NOT BE REQUIRED TO SHOW
PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANT WITH RESPECT TO HEIR
CLAIMS
This Part argues that courts, when confronted with this question, should
adopt the position taken in Mussat and decline to extend the holding in BristolMyers to personal jurisdiction challenges to nonresident members in putative
class actions. Section A analyzes pre-Bristol-Myers case law and finds that
extending Bristol-Myers to class actions would be inconsistent with the
longstanding consensus regarding personal jurisdiction in class action suits.
Section B highlights the differences between class members and representatives
in class actions, arguing that these differences are sufficient to support a
distinction between how personal jurisdiction principles apply to class members
and mass action plaintiffs. Section C argues that Rule 23 provides sufficient
procedural protections to class action defendants, ensuring that defendants are
not unduly harmed. Finally, section D argues that extending Bristol-Myers to the
class action context would contravene the policy goals of the class action device,
as well as impair the efficiency of the court system as a whole.
A. The General Consensus Before Bristol-Myers
From the inception of the class action device until 2017, courts were in broad
agreement that class action plaintiffs could file a nationwide class action in a
federal court without regard for whether that court had personal jurisdiction over
each class member’s claims.224 Thus, in certified class actions, personal
jurisdiction over the defendant was only required to be satisfied with respect to
the named members’ claims.225 Even when the relationship between class
members and the defendant was confined to the plaintiffs’ home states and did
222

Ackerman, supra note 13.
Id.
224
See Mussat v. IQVIA, 953 F.3d 441, 445 (7th Cir. 2020) (“Before the Supreme Court’s decision in
Bristol-Myers, there was a general consensus that due process principles did not prohibit a plaintiff from seeking
to represent a nationwide class in federal court, even if the federal court did not have general jurisdiction over
the defendant.”).
225
Id.
223
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not extend to the forum state, the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the
defendant was not traditionally affected.226 Courts have looked to Rule 23 to
assess limitations on the exercise of class actions,227 rather than the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause, which governs restrictions on personal
jurisdiction.228
This longstanding consensus is important to the question of whether BristolMyers’s holding should apply to class actions because Bristol-Myers purported
to be a mere “straightforward application . . . of settled principles of personal
jurisdiction.”229 Requiring personal jurisdiction to be shown with respect to
every class member’s claims would be far from a simple application of settled
precedent.230 Extending Bristol-Myers to class actions would be inconsistent
with the logic of two prominent U.S. Supreme Court decisions governing class
actions: Califano v. Yamasaki231 and Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts.232 While
Califano and Shutts do not arise directly from personal jurisdiction challenges
to class actions,233 their holdings and the Court’s reasoning provide significant
insight into the personal jurisdiction issue.
Califano involved two class actions brought against the Secretary of the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare arising out of social security
disputes234 consolidated for review.235 The first class action was brought in the
U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii236 and included “all social security
old age and disability benefit recipients resident in the State of Hawaii.”237 A
second class action was brought in the Western District of Washington, in which
the district court certified a nationwide class including “all individuals . . . whose
[social security] benefits have been or will be reduced or otherwise adjusted
without prior notice and opportunity for a hearing[,]” and excluding members of
226

Id.
See, e.g., Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 901 (2008) (rejecting “virtual representation” as insufficient
under Rule 23 procedural protections, which are “grounded in due process”).
228
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1878).
229
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1783 (2017).
230
See generally Mussat, 953 F.3d at 445 (noting before Bristol-Myers “there was a general consensus
that due process principles did not prohibit a plaintiff from seeking to represent a nationwide class in federal
court”).
231
442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979).
232
472 U.S. 797, 811 (1985) (noting “the Due Process Clause . . . does not afford [absent class plaintiffs]
as much protection from state-court jurisdiction” as it does absent defendants in non-class suits).
233
See Califano, 442 U.S. at 684 (listing the primary questions to be addressed in the case); Shutts, 472
U.S. at 803–04 (finding the threshold matter to be “whether petitioner ha[d] standing”).
234
Califano, 442 U.S. at 684.
235
Id. at 690.
236
Id. at 687.
237
Id. at 688 (citation omitted).
227
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both the Hawaii class and a separate class in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania.238 The Secretary argued that the Washington court erred in
certifying a nationwide class because it foreclosed consideration of the issue in
other courts and provided an overly burdensome form of relief that was
unnecessary to provide the plaintiffs complete relief.239
The Court rejected the Secretary’s arguments, finding that the nationwide
class was consistent with Rule 23.240 Because the nationwide class was certified
consistent with Rule 23(b)(2), the decision to certify a nationwide class was
within the discretion of the district court.241 Thus, the district court was free to
weigh the benefits and drawbacks of certifying a nationwide class, and its
determination could only be reversed if it abused its discretion.242 The Court did
not consider whether personal jurisdiction would have been proper with respect
to the claims of any or all of the putative members of the nationwide class.243
Indeed, the Court noted that “[n]othing . . . limits the geographic scope” of a
properly brought class action.244 While personal jurisdiction was not at issue in
Califano,245 the Court’s language suggests that class actions should be reviewed
in accordance with the procedural protections provided by Rule 23.246
In Shutts, plaintiffs brought a nationwide class action in Kansas against the
defendant, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in
Oklahoma.247 Class members included residents of all fifty states, the District of
Columbia, and multiple foreign countries.248 Defendant challenged the class
certification, arguing that Kansas had no jurisdiction over the claims of the outof-state plaintiffs unless they affirmatively consented to join the class or they
had sufficient minimum contacts to support the exercise of personal
jurisdiction.249 The defendant argued that without consent or a showing of

238

Id. at 689 (citation omitted).
Id. at 701–02.
240
See id. at 702–03 (“Nothing in Rule 23 . . . limits the geographical scope of a class action that is brought
in conformity with that Rule.”).
241
Id.
242
See id. at 703 (“[W]e cannot conclude that the District Court . . . abused [its] discretion . . . .”).
243
See id. at 702 (noting “[n]othing in Rule 23 . . . limits the geographical scope of a class action that is
brought in conformity with that Rule”).
244
Id.
245
See id. at 684 (listing the primary questions to be addressed in the case).
246
See id. at 702.
247
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 799 (1985).
248
Id.
249
Id. at 806.
239
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minimum contacts, the due process rights of the class members would be
violated.250
The Court declined to adopt defendant’s argument, instead holding that so
long as the class members are given notice of the litigation and an opportunity
to opt out, the exercise of jurisdiction over them does not violate due process.251
The Court noted that class members cannot be joined as plaintiffs unless they
meet the requirements of Rule 23.252 Moreover, class members do not face the
burdens that defendants face—they do not need to hire counsel, appear in court,
face crossclaims, or incur fees and costs.253 A class member “may sit back and
allow the litigation to run its course, content in knowing that there are safeguards
provided for his protection.”254 Thus, the Court drew a distinction between class
members and defendants, stating that the Due Process Clause does not afford
class members the same protections defendants are afforded.255 The Court
concluded that notice and an opportunity to opt out is sufficient because class
members must be similarly situated with the class representatives, bear no
burdens of litigation, and are fully represented by the named plaintiffs.256
In his Molock dissent, Judge Silberman emphasized that Shutts cannot be
relevant because it discussed a court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over
class members themselves, instead of a court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction
over a class action defendant with respect to the class members’ claims.257 Judge
Silberman noted that the Bristol-Myers Court distinguished Shutts from the case
at issue.258 As the Bristol-Myers Court stated, “the authority of a State to
entertain the claims of nonresident class members is entirely different from its
authority to exercise jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant,” and therefore
Shutts “[had] no bearing on the question presented.”259 Judge Silberman is
correct that Shutts does not require that courts find Bristol-Myers inapplicable
to class actions. However, while Shutts held that courts do not violate due
process in exercising personal jurisdiction over class action plaintiffs rather than

250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259

Id.
Id. at 810–11.
Id. at 809.
Id. at 810.
Id.
Id. at 811.
Id. at 810–11.
Molock v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 952 F.3d 293, 305 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (Silberman, J., dissenting).
Id.
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1783 (2017).
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defendants, its observations illustrate important factors that differentiate class
actions from other types of litigation.260
From 1985, when Shutts was decided, to 2017, when Bristol-Myers was
decided, the Court did not give any indication that Califano and Shutts were no
longer good law. Moreover, the Court did not identify or discuss the issue of
personal jurisdiction with respect to the claims of nonresident class members in
nationwide class actions. In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,261 a Supreme Court
decision that garnered widespread national publicity,262 the Court was faced with
a nationwide employment discrimination class action brought in California
against a defendant incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business
in Arkansas.263 The Court made no mention of any personal jurisdiction
problem.264 Indeed, in Shutts itself, the Court did not identify a personal
jurisdiction problem in a nationwide class action brought in Kansas against a
defendant incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in
Oklahoma.265 Additionally, in the years prior to the Bristol-Myers decision,
lower courts faithfully applied Califano and Shutts and did not discuss the
alleged personal jurisdiction problem.266
Pre-Bristol-Myers caselaw shows that the issue of personal jurisdiction with
respect to the claims of nonresident class members has not been in serious
dispute. Moreover, Bristol-Myers directly describes its holding as a
“straightforward application . . . of settled principles of personal jurisdiction.”267
260
For a full discussion on the differences between class actions and mass actions, and why these
differences matter in determining whether Bristol-Myers applies to class actions, see infra Part IV.B.
261
564 U.S. 338 (2011).
262
See Adam Liptak, Justices Rule for Wal-Mart in Class-Action Bias Case, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/21/business/21bizcourt.html (illustrating that the case made national news).
263
See Walmart Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Mar. 19, 2021) (stating that Wal-Mart is incorporated
in Delaware and has its principal place of business in Arkansas).
264
Mussat v. IQVIA, Inc., 953 F.3d 441, 445 (7th Cir. 2020).
265
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 799, 801, 803 (1985). The parties did not raise, and the
Court did not consider, whether personal jurisdiction was proper over the defendant with respect to each class
member. However, Phillips Petroleum was not subject to general jurisdiction in Kansas (by the modern at home
standard), and it is highly unlikely that each class member, from all different states and countries, was allegedly
injured in Kansas. See id. at 803. Thus, if Bristol-Myers was extended to class actions, this class action would
likely not have been able to be brought in Kansas.
266
See, e.g., Day v. Persels & Assocs., LLC, 729 F.3d 1309, 1324 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Shutts, 472 U.S.
at 811) (“[A]bsent class members do not have the same constitutional interest in the conduct of litigation as a
named party.”); Bresgal v. Brock, 843 F.2d 1163, 1170 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S.
682, 702 (1979)) (“[T]here is no bar against class-wide, and nationwide relief in federal district court or circuit
court when it is appropriate.”); Garcia v. Johnson, No. 14-cv-01775, 2014 WL 6657591, at *15–*16 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 21, 2014) (citing Califano, 442 U.S. at 702) (certifying nationwide class action when defendant was not
subject to general jurisdiction in the district).
267
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1783 (2017).
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It is clear that the holding of Bristol-Myers does not overrule Califano, Shutts,
or any other previous class action case permitting the certification of a
nationwide class. Nothing in the Bristol-Myers opinion explicitly compels courts
to extend its holding to the class action context.
B. Class Members Are Not Full Parties to a Class Action
Although Bristol-Myers did not expressly apply its holding to class actions,
Judge Silberman’s dissent in Molock argues that the logic of the decision dictates
that result.268 Judge Silberman compared class actions to the mass action in
Bristol-Myers, describing each as a “species of joinder, which ‘merely enables
a federal court to adjudicate claims of multiple parties at once, instead of in
separate suits.’”269 Judge Silberman characterized any differences that may exist
between the role of plaintiffs in a mass action and that of class members as
irrelevant, and as a result, concluded that Bristol-Myers must be applicable to
class actions.270 Conversely, Mussat stated that “[c]lass actions . . . are different
from many other types of aggregate litigation, and that difference matters in
numerous ways for the unnamed members of the class.”271 The Seventh Circuit
in Mussat concluded that, because the status of class members is materially
different from mass action plaintiffs, Bristol-Myers should not apply.272 Thus,
the differences between class members and mass action plaintiffs and the
relevance of these differences is critical to determining Bristol-Myers’s
application to class actions. In explaining why Bristol-Myers should not apply
to class actions, this section will first argue that class members and mass action
plaintiffs are differently situated. Then, it will argue that the differences are
sufficient to support a distinction between class members and mass action
plaintiffs for personal jurisdiction purposes.
1. Inherent Differences Between Class Members and Mass Action Plaintiffs
In a mass action, each plaintiff is an active, named party with a claim that
must be proven individually, as if each plaintiff was filing a separate lawsuit.273
Each plaintiff’s case is consolidated into a coordinated action for efficient

268

Molock v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 952 F.3d 293, 306 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (Silberman, J., dissenting).
Id. (citation omitted).
270
See id. at 306–07 (“[T]he party status of absent class members seems to me to be irrelevant.”).
271
Mussat v. IQVIA, Inc., 953 F.3d 441, 446–47 (7th Cir. 2020).
272
Id. at 447 (noting “absent class members are not full parties to the case,” unlike plaintiffs in a
coordinated mass action).
273
See id. (“[A] coordinated mass action . . . does not involve any absentee litigants. . . . [A]ll of the
plaintiffs are named parties to the case.”).
269
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resolution of the common legal issues among their claims.274 Throughout the
proceedings, each mass action plaintiff is a full party to the case,275 and BristolMyers holds that personal jurisdiction must be satisfied over the defendant with
respect to each of the plaintiffs’ claims.276 Unliked mass action plaintiffs, class
members are not automatically full parties to the litigation—they “may be
parties for some purposes and not for others.”277 Class members do not prove
their claims individually; the entire class is bound by the judgment rendered in
the class action “even though [the class members] are not parties to the suit.”278
In addition to these differences, class members carry a minimal burden
compared to the burdens that mass action plaintiffs bear.279 As Shutts described,
class members are not required to do anything.280 They are “given a ‘free ride’
under Rule 23 and [have] no duty to actively engage in the prosecution of the
action.”281 Class members are under no obligation to retain counsel or make an
appearance in court, and are not subject to any of the liabilities that ordinary
plaintiffs face in pursuing litigation.282 Class members “are almost never subject
to counterclaims, crossclaims, or liability for fees and costs,” and “are not
subject to coercive or punitive remedies.”283 They are subject to discovery only
in limited circumstances.284 Generally, the worst outcome that can occur to a
class member is the extinguishment of any of their potential legal claims that
were litigated by the representatives in the class action.285
Additionally, unlike in mass actions and ordinary lawsuits, the fact that
additional class members are a part of the litigation does not significantly
increase the litigation burden faced by the defendant.286 In a class action, the
274

Id.
See Sanchez v. Launch Tech. Workforce Sols., LLC, 297 F. Supp. 3d 1360, 1365 (N.D. Ga. 2018) (“In
a mass tort action such as Bristol-Myers, each plaintiff is a real party in interest . . . .”).
276
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017).
277
Devlin v. Scardelleti, 536 U.S. 1, 9–10 (2002).
278
Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 314 (2011).
279
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 810 (1985).
280
Id.
281
Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999, 1005 (7th Cir. 1971).
282
Shutts, 472 U.S. at 810.
283
Id.
284
See Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (noting “discovery against absentee class
members . . . cannot be had as a matter of course” but may be available under certain circumstances); Brennan,
450 F.2d at 1005 (noting “absent class members should not be required to submit to discovery as a matter of
course,” but may be required to do so if ordered by the court).
285
Shutts, 472 U.S. at 810.
286
See id. This is not to say that defendants face no special burden whatsoever by the certification of a
class action. Any class action certification threatens to subject the defendant to the aggregate liability of the class
action. See Globus v. L. Rsch. Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1285 (2d Cir. 1969) (“Compensatory damages,
275
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class members are represented in full by the named parties.287 The defendant is
not confronted with any additional or different claims by the class members,288
does not have to hire additional counsel or travel to another forum to litigate the
class members’ claims,289 and does not have to participate in additional
discovery with respect to the class members.290 Thus, the certification of a class
action does not heighten the litigation burden on the defendant as the joinder of
an additional mass action plaintiff does.
2. Class Members Are Not “Parties” for Personal Jurisdiction Purposes
Again, while mass action plaintiffs are full parties to their case,291 class
members are not, by definition, full parties to a class action.292 Recognizing the
unique role possessed by class members, the Supreme Court has stated that class
members “may be parties for some purposes and not for others.”293 The “party”
label refers to a determination of the proper procedural rule to apply to the class
members.294 Thus, in the context of Bristol-Myers’s application to class actions,
the issue to be determined is whether class members are “parties” for the
purposes of determining personal jurisdiction. If the class members are “parties,”
then Bristol-Myers would apply, and the court would need to have personal
jurisdiction over the defendant with respect to each class members’ claim. If the
class members are not “parties,” then Bristol-Myers would not apply and only
the class representatives would need to demonstrate personal jurisdiction.295
Class members have been held to not be full parties in many, if not most,
contexts in which the question has been raised. For example, with respect to
federal diversity jurisdiction, class members are not considered “parties” for the
especially when multiplied in a class action, have a potent deterrent effect.”). However, since class members
bear essentially no burden during litigation, and are under no obligation to do anything, the defendant also does
not have to do anything in response to the additional class members’ presence.
287
See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 809 (“The court and named plaintiffs protect [absent class members’]
interests.”).
288
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3) (requiring that the claims of the named parties be “typical of the claims or
defenses of the class”).
289
See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 808 (stating that defendants “must generally hire counsel and travel to the
forum,” while class members do not bear burdens “of the same order or magnitude”).
290
See Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins.
Co., 450 F.2d 999, 1005 (7th Cir. 1971).
291
See Sanchez v. Launch Tech. Workforce Sols., LLC, 297 F. Supp. 3d 1360, 1365 (N.D. Ga. 2018) (“In
a mass tort action such as Bristol-Myers, each plaintiff is a real party in interest . . . .”).
292
Devlin v. Scardelleti, 536 U.S. 1, 9–10 (2002).
293
Id.
294
See id. at 10 (“The label ‘party’ does not indicate an absolute characteristic, but rather a conclusion
about the applicability of various procedural rules that may differ based on context.”).
295
See Mussat v. IQVIA, Inc., 953 F.3d 441, 447 (7th Cir. 2020).
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purposes of the complete diversity rule.296 This result is justified by the difficulty
that would arise if courts were forced to ascertain both the citizenship of every
party to a class action and the likelihood that application of the complete
diversity rule would “destroy diversity in almost all class actions.”297 In addition,
class members are not “parties” that are independently required to meet the
amount-in-controversy requirement.298 In a class action, only the named
representatives must allege a sufficient amount-in-controversy.299
Furthermore, class members are not “parties” for the purposes of
determining the proper venue for a class action.300 As with diversity jurisdiction,
requiring venue to be shown with respect to every class member would
drastically diminish the effectiveness of the class action device.301 Moreover,
class members are not “parties” in the sense that they must be served process.302
Finally, class members are not considered to be “parties” in that a magistrate
judge may issue a judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 636303 without the consent of
every class member.304 Because “the named party ‘is the “party” to the lawsuit
who acts on behalf of the entire class,’” class members “do not have the same
constitutional interest in the conduct of litigation.”305

296
Devlin, 536 U.S. at 9. Diversity jurisdiction may be exercised when both the plaintiff and the defendant
are citizens of different U.S. states, or of a state and a foreign country, and the amount in controversy exceeds
$75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
297
Devlin, 536 U.S. at 10. In federal class actions, diversity is satisfied when any member of a class is
diverse from any defendant, and the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).
298
See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 340 (1969) (holding that class action members may not aggregate
their claims to meet the amount-in-controversy requirement); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545
U.S. 546, 566–67 (2005) (recognizing that under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, courts have supplemental jurisdiction over
diversity claims when some, but not all, plaintiffs meet the amount-in-controversy requirement).
299
See Allapattah, 545 U.S. at 566–67.
300
See Curley v. Brignoli, Curley & Roberts Assocs., 915 F.2d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1990) (“[C]lass status may
expand the number of districts where venue is proper.”).
301
See Appleton Elec. Co. v. Advance-United Expressways, 494 F.2d 126, 140 (7th Cir. 1974) (“[T]o
require the establishment of venue for nonrepresentative-party class members ‘would eliminate the use of the
class-action route in all cases where a defendant class is appropriate.’” (citation omitted)).
302
Coleman v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n of Wis., 860 F.3d 461, 474 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Unnamed class
members, for instance, are not full-fledged parties, and so they need not be served with process . . . .”); see also
United States v. Trucking Emp., Inc., 72 F.R.D. 101, 105 (D.D.C. 1976) (“Class actions are the only significant
exception to the general rule that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in litigation to which he/she has
not been made a party by service of process.”).
303
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636, magistrate judges are granted authority, with the authorization and consent of
the parties and the district court, to “conduct any or all proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment in the
case.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1).
304
Koby v. ARS Nat’l Servs., Inc., 846 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 2017); see Day v. Persels & Assocs.,
LLC, 729 F.3d 1309, 1324 (11th Cir. 2013); Dewey v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 681 F.3d 170, 181 (3d
Cir. 2012); Williams v. Gen. Elec. Cap. Auto Lease, Inc., 159 F.3d 266, 269 (7th Cir. 1998).
305
Day, 729 F.3d at 1324 (citation omitted).
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In a few instances, courts have held that class action members are “parties”
to a class action.306 When this has occurred, the “major goals of class action
litigation” have justified the categorization of class members as “parties” for the
purpose at issue.307 For example, class members are “parties” in the sense that
they are bound by the judgment in a class action as if they were full plaintiffs.308
This, of course, goes to one of the central purposes of the class action device—
to allow a class of injured parties to litigate collectively to ensure recovery when
each injured class member’s damages are too small to justify independent
litigation.309 Preventing class members from being bound by the judgment
would allow class members to re-litigate the dispute in a subsequent action,
defeating the principal purposes of class action litigation. As the Supreme Court
has described, “[t]o hold to the contrary would frustrate the principal function of
a class suit” because it would incentivize class members “to file earlier
individual motions or intervene as parties—precisely the multiplicity of activity
which Rule 23 was designed to avoid.”310
In American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, the Supreme Court held that
class members are “parties” in the sense that the filing of a class action satisfies
the statute of limitations with respect to the class members as well as the named
parties.311 This result is another instance in which if class members were not
considered “parties,” the whole purpose of the class action device would be
frustrated.312 Moreover, in Devlin v. Scardelleti, the Court held that a class
member who objects to the settlement of a class action is a “party” that may
bring an appeal.313 This is a function of the fact that class members are bound
by the judgment, as “this feature of class action litigation . . . requires that class
members be allowed to appeal the approval of a settlement when they have
objected.”314
The main takeaway from these determinations about whether class members
are parties is that the proper determination depends on the context at issue.315

306
See Devlin v. Scardelleti, 536 U.S. 1, 10 (2002); Rsch. Corp. v. Pfister Associated Growers, Inc., 301
F. Supp. 497, 503 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
307
Devlin, 536 U.S. at 10.
308
Id.
309
See, e.g., Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) (“[A]ggrieved persons may be
without effective redress unless they may employ the class-action device.”).
310
Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 551 (1974).
311
Id.
312
Id.
313
Devlin, 536 U.S. at 9.
314
Id. at 10.
315
See id. (“The label ‘party’ . . . may differ based on context.”).
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When the essential character of class action litigation necessitates finding that
class members are parties, courts have recognized them as such. However, when
classification of class members as parties is not supported by the “major goals
of class action litigation,”316 or even contradicts those goals, then class members
will not be considered parties. In the personal jurisdiction context, classifying
class members as parties such that Bristol-Myers would require a court to have
personal jurisdiction over each member’s claim would not further the goals of
class action litigation—it would be more likely to impede them.317 Instead,
treating personal jurisdiction the same way as subject matter jurisdiction, service
of process, and venue would be more sensible and consistent.318 Thus, class
members should likewise not be considered parties for personal jurisdiction
purposes, and therefore should not be subject to the same personal jurisdiction
requirements that Bristol-Myers articulated for mass actions.
C. Rule 23 Provides Sufficient Procedural Protections to Defendants by
Ensuring that Each Class Member Is Similarly Situated and Is Bringing
Essentially the Same Claim
In Molock, Judge Silberman argued that it is “irrelevant whether the class
members were “parties.”319 Instead, the relevant inquiry established by BristolMyers should be “whether limits on personal jurisdiction protect a defendant
from out-of-state claims.”320 However, unlike in a mass action, where each
plaintiff is free to levy individual and independent claims,321 a class action’s
claims are “unitary” and “coherent.”322 The class members’ claims are merged
with the named representatives’ claims, such that the defendant need only
respond to the overall claim of the class.323 Rule 23’s requirements for the
certification of a class action provide a barrier ensuring that the class claim is in
fact unitary and coherent, thus erecting a safeguard to protect the rights of class
action defendants—a safeguard that does not exist with respect to mass

316

Id.
For a discussion on the policy problems that would arise if Bristol-Myers were applied to class actions,
see infra Part IV.D.
318
See Mussat v. IQVIA, Inc. 953 F.3d 441, 447 (7th Cir. 2020).
319
Molock v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 952 F.3d 293, 307 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (Silberman, J., dissenting).
320
Id.
321
See, e.g., Sanchez v. Launch Tech. Workforce Sols., LLC, 297 F. Supp. 3d 1360, 1366 (N.D. Ga. 2018)
(“[A] mass action . . . may—and likely would—present significant variations in the plaintiffs’ claims.”).
322
Id. at 1366.
323
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2)–(3).
317
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actions.324 As a result, Rule 23’s requirements to certify a class action are an
adequate vehicle to ensure the due process rights of defendants are not infringed
by additional, out-of-state claims.325
Rule 23 requires, as a “prerequisite” for the certification of a class action,
that “there are questions of law or fact common to the class”326 and “the claims
or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of
the class.”327 Moreover, in seeking to certify a class action, the plaintiff must
show the defendant “acted . . . on grounds that apply generally to the class, so
that . . . relief . . . is appropriate respecting the class as a whole” under Rule
23(b)(2),328 or that “questions of law or fact common to class members
predominate” under Rule 23(b)(3).329 Finally, the plaintiff must seek class
certification from the court, and the court ultimately decides whether the case
may proceed as a class action.330
These protective measures “adequately protect [class action defendants’]
due process rights.”331 Rule 23 ensures that a class action consists of a single,
unitary claim litigated by the named representatives on behalf of the class
members. This is quite different from mass actions, “which may—and likely
would—present significant variations in the plaintiffs’ claims.”332 Furthermore,
by requiring that a class action be certified by the court, Rule 23 serves a
gatekeeping function that prevents the arbitrary, haphazard formulation of class
actions.
While it is true that the Rule “primarily focuses on the relationship between
the claims of the named representatives and the class members,”333 these

324
See Sanchez, 297 F. Supp. 3d at 1366 (“[I]n contrast to a mass action like Bristol-Myers, . . . the
requirements of Rule 23 class certification ensure that the defendant is presented with a unitary, coherent claim
. . . .”).
325
See Jones v. Depuy Synthes Prods., Inc., 330 F.R.D. 298, 312 (N.D. Ala. 2018) (“[T]he certification
procedures set forth in Rule 23 not only protect absent class members’ due process rights but also the rights of
defendants.”); see also Mullenix, supra note 14, at 417–18 (describing due process protections provided by Rule
23 and noting other forms of aggregate litigation offer none of these protections).
326
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).
327
Id. at (a)(3).
328
Id. at (b)(2).
329
Id. at (b)(3). While there are three types of class actions recognized by Rule 23(b), the 23(b)(1) class
action is the least utilized. See 2 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:2 (5th ed. 2021
update) (discussing why 23(b)(1) class actions arise infrequently compared to 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) class
actions).
330
Id. at (c).
331
Jones v. Depuy Synthes Prods., Inc., 330 F.R.D. 298, 312 (N.D. Ala. 2018).
332
Sanchez v. Launch Tech. Workforce Sols., LLC, 297 F. Supp. 3d 1360, 1366 (N.D. Ga. 2018).
333
Molock v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 952 F.3d 293, 307 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (Silberman, J., dissenting).
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principles nonetheless serve the purpose of protecting the defendants in a class
action, as well as the class members themselves. The fact that Rule 23 may be
intended to protect the class members should not abrogate the reality that it also
protects defendants. For these reasons, Rule 23 ensures there is “no unfairness
in haling [a class action defendant] into court to answer to [a class claim] in a
forum that has specific jurisdiction over the defendant based on the
representative’s claim.”334 Rule 23 ensures class action defendants are protected
from unfair out-of-state class action claims, regardless of whether the class
members are “parties” for personal jurisdiction purposes.
D. Applying Bristol-Myers to Class Actions Would Inhibit Both the Policy
Goals of Class Actions and Impair the Overall Efficiency of the Judicial
System
Neither Bristol-Myers itself, nor the demands of due process, require that
personal jurisdiction over the defendant be shown with respect to class members
in a class action. In addition, extending the holding of Bristol-Myers to the class
action context would be an unwise choice, as it would contravene the policy
goals of both the class action device and the court system as a whole. As a result,
courts should decline to interpret Bristol-Myers to apply to class actions.335
The “principal function” of a class action suit is to prevent a “multiplicity”
of various lawsuits, as well as “unnecessary filing of repetitious papers and
motions” with a single, unitary action by which the claims of the class could be
litigated.336 Class actions “save[] the resources of both the courts and the parties
by permitting an issue potentially affecting every [class member] to be litigated
in an economical fashion under Rule 23.”337 Another purpose of the class action
device is to prevent undesirable inconsistent judgments about similar issues of
law and fact, which “would establish incompatible standards of conduct.”338 The
availability of class actions ensures each injured party’s claims are resolved in
the same way and in an efficient manner.339

334

Sanchez, 297 F. Supp. 3d at 1366.
See Devlin v. Scardelleti, 536 U.S. 1, 10 (2002) (explaining that the decision of whether class members
should be considered “parties” for various procedural purposes turns on whether “goals of class action litigation”
would be furthered or inhibited by such a consideration).
336
Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 550–51 (1974).
337
Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 701 (1979).
338
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A).
339
See Sueoka v. United States, 101 F. App’x 649, 654–55 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Addressing [a claim] in a
single, rather than multiple, action, is the preferable approach . . . .”).
335
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If personal jurisdiction was required to be shown with respect to every class
member’s claim against the defendant, a likely consequence would be that
smaller, duplicative lawsuits would be brought in multiple jurisdictions. BristolMyers contemplated this exact possibility, noting “plaintiffs who are residents
of a particular State—for example, the 92 plaintiffs from Texas and the 71 from
Ohio—could probably sue together in their home States.”340 Applying this
principle to class actions would cause the very defects that the class action is
designed to prevent. When general jurisdiction over the defendant is not
possible,341 the result, assuming the plaintiffs still bring their claims, would be
redundant lawsuits in numerous states. This piecemeal litigation would lead to
the “unnecessary filing of repetitious papers and motions,” thus defeating the
primary purpose of the class action device.342 It would also be likely to lead to
inconsistent judgments among the multiplicity of lawsuits, which would
contravene another purpose of the class action device343 and may lead to
potentially tricky issues of preclusion.344 As a result, plaintiffs whose claims
would have been resolved the same way in a class action could instead see their
claims resolved inconsistently.
It could be argued that a rise in statewide class actions may be consistent
with the Court’s tendency to discourage nationwide class actions. In Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc v. Dukes, the Court rejected certification of a class action on grounds
that the class members’ claims were not sufficiently common under Rule
23(a)(2).345 As a result, class members filed smaller statewide class actions in an
effort to satisfy the Rule 23(a)(2) commonality requirement.346 However, the
critical difference between Wal-Mart and a hypothetical case applying BristolMyers to class actions is that Wal-Mart was based on commonality—a principal

340
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct 1773, 1783 (2017). The Court cited this
possibility of piecemeal litigation as a rebuttal of the idea that its decision would result in a “parade of horribles.”
Id.
341
As Justice Sotomayor noted in her Bristol-Myers dissent, “it is difficult to imagine where it might be
possible to bring a nationwide mass action against two or more defendants headquartered and incorporated in
different States. . . . What about a nationwide mass action brought against a defendant not headquartered or
incorporated in the United States?” Id. at 1789 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
342
Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 550 (1974).
343
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A) (noting class actions may be certified when separate, individual actions
would “create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that would
establish incompatible standards of conduct”).
344
See Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979) (granting trial courts discretion to
determine whether it would be fair for a nonparty plaintiff to assert issue preclusion over a defendant).
345
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 359–60 (2011).
346
See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1117 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (“Plaintiffs returned
to the district court and sought to redefine a smaller class that would conform to the Supreme Court’s holding.”).
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element of a class action.347 Robust enforcement of Rule 23(a)’s protections is
necessary to ensure that defendants are not unjustly subjected to class liability
through flimsy, arbitrary class actions. On the other hand, the personal
jurisdiction issue does not relate to the merits of a class claim. Applying BristolMyers to class actions would impose a broad impediment to meritorious
nationwide class actions such that the class action device itself would be
rendered ineffective because some of the main purposes of class actions—
preventing redundant litigation and inconsistent judgments—would be defeated.
The class action device is not the only instrument the court system has to
maximize judicial efficiency and economy. By virtue of the importance of these
goals, the law recognizes multiple means by which the ordinary rules of personal
and subject matter jurisdiction may be circumvented. Under the doctrine of
pendent personal jurisdiction, for example, a court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over a defendant “with respect to a claim for which there is no
independent basis of personal jurisdiction so long as it arises out of a common
nucleus of operative facts with a claim in the same suit over which the court does
have personal jurisdiction.”348 As courts have concluded, “[w]hen a defendant
must appear in a forum to defend against one claim, it is often reasonable to
compel that defendant to answer other claims in the same suit.”349 The goals of
“judicial economy, avoidance of piecemeal litigation, and overall convenience
of the parties” support the doctrine of pendent personal jurisdiction.350
Additionally, through the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction, federal courts
may exercise subject matter jurisdiction over state claims when the claim derives
from the same “common nucleus of operative fact” as a valid federal claim.351
The justification for this doctrine also “lies in considerations of judicial
economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants.”352
Pendent personal jurisdiction and supplemental subject matter jurisdiction
demonstrate the law’s encouragement to resolve claims together when those
claims can be resolved together. However, in Sloan v. General Motors LLC,
despite recognizing that “it is by no means clear whether [the] pendent personal
347

See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2) (requiring “questions of law or fact common to the class”).
Action Embroidery Corp. v. Atl. Embroidery, Inc., 368 F.3d 1174, 1180 (9th Cir. 2004).
349
Id. at 1181; see also United States v. Botefuhr, 309 F.3d 1263, 1273 (10th Cir. 2002) (agreeing pendent
personal jurisdiction is appropriate “where claims ‘arise from the same common nucleus of operative fact’”
(citation omitted)); IUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund v. Herrmann, 9 F.3d 1049, 1056 (2d Cir. 1993) (“Under the
doctrine of pendent personal jurisdiction . . . the district court may assert personal jurisdiction over the parties
to the related . . . claims even if personal jurisdiction is not otherwise available.”).
350
Action Embroidery, 368 F.3d at 1181.
351
United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
352
Id. at 726.
348
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jurisdiction doctrine extends categorically to claims brought by different
plaintiffs,” the district court nonetheless applied the doctrine in the class action
context.353 The court declined to apply Bristol-Myers to class actions on grounds
that the defendant “would face piecemeal litigation and would have to defend
itself in several different courts on nearly identical issues.”354 In addition,
because the various lawsuits would encompass claims that “[arose] out of the
same nucleus of operative facts,” the resulting adjudications would overlap and
possibly conflict with each other.355
The negative externalities that result from piecemeal litigation should be
considered when considering whether Bristol-Myers should be extended to class
actions. By definition, every named and nonnamed member of a class action
must present a claim arising from the same nucleus of operative facts.356 Class
actions are a valuable tool to permit these claims to be litigated together without
requiring the plaintiffs and defendant(s) to travel to multiple fora, file repetitious
motions, and undertake repetitive, tedious discovery. Given that the BristolMyers Court identified piecemeal litigation in the mass action context as a likely
consequence of its holding,357 the same result would be expected to occur to
class actions if Bristol-Myers were made applicable to them. Considering the
likelihood that piecemeal litigation would arise if Bristol-Myers were extended
to class actions, as well as the notable differences between mass actions and
class actions and the presence of Rule 23’s protections, courts should adopt
Mussat’s conclusion and decline to apply Bristol-Myers to class actions.
V. CONCERNS AND IMPLICATIONS
As courts continue to confront personal jurisdiction challenges to class
members’ claims in class action suits, and as the possibility of eventual Supreme
Court review grows, the potential consequences for aggregate litigation remain
grave. Recent Court decisions have dramatically restricted the exercise of
general jurisdiction over corporate defendants; the original “continuous and
systematic” approach taken in International Shoe and expounded upon in
Helicopteros has given way to the “essentially at home” standard adopted in
Goodyear and Daimler.358 This new standard essentially limits the exercise of
353

287 F. Supp. 3d 840, 861 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
Id. at 862.
355
Id.
356
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2)–(3).
357
See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1783 (2017) (noting “plaintiffs who
are residents of a particular State . . . could probably sue together in their home States”).
358
See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011); Daimler AG v.
354
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general jurisdiction to a maximum of two fora: the defendant’s place of
incorporation and its principal place of business.359 Regardless of the merits of
the Court’s limitations on general jurisdiction, the simple reality is that it is now
more difficult to bring lawsuits against corporate defendants who do business in
many states.360 Consequently, there are now instances in which it is impossible
to bring a general jurisdiction action against some corporate defendants in the
United States. Lawsuits against two or more defendants that are neither
incorporated nor maintain their principal place of business in the same state
likely cannot be brought anywhere under general jurisdiction.361 In addition, a
defendant that is neither incorporated nor has its principal place of business
anywhere in the United States cannot be subject to general jurisdiction in any
state.362
The narrowing of general jurisdiction has required plaintiffs to classify cases
that may have formerly been brought under general jurisdiction as specific
jurisdiction cases. Bristol-Myers is an example of this. After the Court’s decision
in Daimler, the Bristol-Myers plaintiffs were forced to abandon their general
jurisdiction theory and proceed on specific jurisdiction grounds.363 The eventual
result, when the case reached the Supreme Court, was a narrowing of specific
jurisdiction. Every plaintiff in a mass action must now satisfy personal
jurisdiction over the defendant with respect to their claim.364 As a result, large,
nationwide mass actions can effectively be brought only where the defendant is
subject to general jurisdiction, or in the form of multiple smaller actions in
multiple states.365
Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014).
359
Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137.
360
Compare Goodyear, 564 U.S at 919 (holding that general jurisdiction may be asserted over corporate
defendants when their contacts are “so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home” in the
forum state), and Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137 (noting a corporation’s place of incorporation and principal place of
business are the “paradigm bases” for when a corporation is “fairly regarded as at home”), with Rush v. Savchuk,
444 U.S. 320, 330 (1980) (stating defendants could be subject to general jurisdiction in all fifty states by virtue
of “continuous and systematic” contacts with every state).
361
See Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1789 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is difficult to imagine where it
might be possible to bring a nationwide mass action against two or more defendants headquartered and
incorporated in different States.”). Although Daimler did not state, as a categorical matter, that a corporation
could only be subject to general jurisdiction in its state of incorporation or its state of principal place of business,
it did state that these are the “paradigm forums” for general jurisdiction, and no subsequent case has permitted
general jurisdiction on other grounds. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137.
362
See Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1789 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“What about a nationwide mass
action brought against a defendant not headquartered or incorporated in the United States?”).
363
See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct., 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 412, 424 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014).
364
Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1783.
365
See id. (remarking plaintiffs in mass-action suits are free to file in the states in which the defendant is
subject to general jurisdiction, or as an alternative, plaintiffs could sue jointly in their home state with the other

MIKUTA_1.4.22

368

1/4/2022 10:53 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71:325

The class action, however, remains unchanged—the Bristol-Myers opinion
does not address the question of whether its holding would apply to a class action
in which a court does not have personal jurisdiction over the claims of some of
the class members, as Justice Sotomayor’s dissenting opinion notes.366 As with
mass actions, applying Bristol-Myers in the class-action context would
effectively require large, nationwide class-action suits to be filed only in states
in which the defendant is subject to general jurisdiction.367 This application
would at the very least affect where class actions are filed, and may affect
whether some class-action suits ever get filed. It would “force[] injured plaintiffs
to bear the burden of bringing suit in what will often be far flung
jurisdictions.”368 It will “make it difficult to aggregate the claims of plaintiffs
across the country whose claims may be worth little alone,”369 and as a result,
these claims may never be brought. Applying Bristol-Myers to class actions
would “curtail—and in some cases eliminate—plaintiffs’ ability to hold
corporations fully accountable for their nationwide conduct.”370
These consequences, if they came to fruition, would be detrimental to the
legal system as a whole, given the important and valuable role that class actions
play.371 Class actions serve the essential purpose of affording injured parties an
opportunity for recovery when an individual suit is impossible or impractical.372
This ensures that defendants who cause small damages to a large amount of
people are not free from liability for their wrongdoing.373 These critical functions
would be threatened if the class action device becomes less available to potential
class action plaintiffs.
CONCLUSION
Extending the holding of Bristol-Myers from mass actions to class actions
would be anything but a “straightforward application . . . of settled principles of

plaintiffs from that state).
366
Id. at 1789 n.4 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
367
Id. at 1783 (majority opinion).
368
Id. at 1789 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
369
Id. at 1784.
370
Id. at 1789.
371
See CAFA, 28 U.S.C. § 1711 (“Class action lawsuits are an important and valuable part of the legal
system . . . .”).
372
See Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[S]mall recoveries do not
provide the incentive for an individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights.”).
373
See id. (noting “the class action [was] more likely to proceed, thereby helping to deter future
violations”).
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personal jurisdiction.”374 Such an application would allow challenges to courts’
personal jurisdiction over class members’ claims to grind class action procedure
to a halt. It would also threaten to deprive society of the benefits that Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23 provides. Class actions promote the efficient
resolution of cases, allow injured parties to pursue claims that may otherwise be
impossible to pursue, and deter wrongful conduct that the ordinary litigation
system is incapable of deterring. Requiring courts to have personal jurisdiction
over the claims of every class member would undoubtedly lead to the dismissal
of many class action lawsuits and would result in many more never being filed.
Moreover, this application is unnecessary and unjustified by a need to
protect defendants’ due process. Rule 23 sufficiently protects defendants by
setting forth the requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and
adequacy.375 Moreover, a putative class action must still meet the criteria of
Rule 23(b),376 and even then, certification is subject to the court’s discretion.377
These procedures are designed to ensure that defendants are protected from
unfair and arbitrary class action certification while preserving plaintiffs’ ability
to make use of the class action device. Applying Bristol-Myers’s holding to class
actions would over-protect defendants at the expense of legitimate, meritorious
class action plaintiffs. For these reasons, courts faced with the question of
whether to apply Bristol-Myers to class actions should adopt the conclusion
reached in Mussat and preserve the class action as an effective tool for aggregate
litigation.
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Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1783.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
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See id. at (b).
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See id. at (c).
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